Abstract Algebraic manipulation detection codes are a cryptographic primitive that was introduced by Cramer et al. (Eurocrypt 2008). It encompasses several methods that were previously used in cheater detection in secret sharing. Since its introduction, a number of additional applications have been found. This paper contains a detailed exposition of the known results about algebraic manipulation detection codes as well as some new results.
Introduction
Consider an abstract device Σ(G) that can store a single element x from a fixed, publicly known finite abelian group G. An adversary cannot obtain any information on the value stored in Σ(G), but he can manipulate the stored data by adding some value δ ∈ G of his choice. As a result, Σ(G) stores the value x + δ. This value depends only on the adversary's a priori knowledge of x. Such a tampering is called an algebraic manipulation.
One-time-pad encryption is an example of such a device. It hides the message perfectly but an adversary can add any string to it without being detected. Linear secret sharing provides another example. The reader is referred to [1] for a recent survey on secret sharing. In a linear secret sharing scheme, a secret value is distributed into shares among a set of participants. Only some qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret value form their shares. Both the secret and the shares are vectors over some finite field, and the secret is reconstructed by computing a linear map on the shares of a qualified set. A coalition of dishonest players may have no information about the secret value, but they can manipulate the output of the reconstruction process by providing forged shares. Because of the homomorphic properties of such schemes, they can control the difference between the shared secret s and the incorrect reconstructed value s .
An algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code encodes a source s into a value x ∈ G stored in Σ(G) in such a way that any algebraic manipulation is detected with high probability, even if the adversary knows the value of s. In contrast to standard message authentication codes, there is no secret key involved. Algebraic manipulation detection codes were introduced in [5] as an abstraction of several previously presented methods for cheating detection in linear secret sharing schemes [4, [15] [16] [17] [18] 22] This paper contains a detailed presentation of the known results about AMD codes, and also some new results: the bound in Theorem 5.4, and the construction strategies in Subsections 7.2 and 7.3.
Definitions and lower bounds
Definition 2.1.
Let S be a set of size m > 1 and G a commutative group of order n. Consider a pair (E, D) formed by a probabilistic encoding map E : S → G and a deterministic decoding map D : G → S ∪ {⊥} such that D(E(s)) = s with probability 1 for every s ∈ S.
•
The pair (E, D) is an (m, n, ε)-algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code if for every s ∈ S and for every δ ∈ G, the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /
∈ {s, ⊥} is at most ε.
• The pair (E, D) is a weak (m, n, ε)-algebraic manipulation detection code if for every δ ∈ G and for s sampled uniformly at random from S (independent of δ), the probability that D(E(s) + δ) / ∈ {s, ⊥} is at most ε.
Trivially, since the bound ε on the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /
∈ {s, ⊥} holds for every fixed choice of δ ∈ G, it also holds for δ chosen in a randomized way, as long as it is chosen independently of the randomness of the probabilistic encoding map E, and of the uniform choice of s in the case of a weak AMD code.
The following bounds on the size of codewords in AMD codes were proved by Ogata and Kurosawa [16] in the framework of cheating detection in secret sharing.
Theorem 2.2.
In every (m, n, ε)-AMD code, respectively weak (m, n, ε)-AMD code,
Proof.
For every s ∈ S, consider
where D −1 (s ) naturally denotes the set of all g ∈ G with D(g) = s . First note that for arbitrary but fixed s ∈ S and E(s) ∈ G, and for δ ∈ G \ {0} chosen uniformly at random, E(s) + δ is uniformly distributed over G \ {E(s)}, and thus the probability that D(E(s) + δ) / ∈ {s, ⊥} is ρ(s). The bound for weak AMD codes now follows from observing that |D −1 (s )| 1 for every s ∈ S and thus ρ(s) (m − 1)/(n − 1), and from noting that if this bound (m − 1)/(n − 1) on the probability that D(E(s) + δ) / ∈ {s, ⊥} holds for every fixed choice of s and E(s), it also hold for randomized choices, so that ε (m − 1)/(n − 1).
The bound for ordinary (i.e., non-weak) AMD codes follows from observing that here |D −1 (s )| 1/ε for every s ∈ S, as can easily be seen, and from noting similarly to above that the resulting bound on the probability that D(E(s) + δ) / ∈ {s, ⊥} also holds for a randomized choice of E(s).
The tag length log n − log m of an (m, n, ε)-AMD code measures the number of redundant bits that are needed to encode the source. A natural optimization problem is to minimize the tag length for any given values of the source length log m and the adversary's success probability ε. More specifically, minimizing the tag length for families of AMD codes encoding arbitrarily long messages for a fixed value of ε.
